Cognitive Embodiment of Nature Re-cognized Systemically (Part #8)
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Related speculation has extended to the nature of cyborgs as a form which extratrrestrials might take -- notably imagined as the hive-minded Borg in the popular Star Trek series. As " cybernetic organisms", such cyborgs are understood to be composed of both organic and biomechatronic body parts. Rather than being a matter of specluation, the Wikipedia entry notes in detail the cyborg proliferation in society at this time. Indeed many people currently have implants or other parts of a biomechatronic nature. Already some have electronic implants ("microchips") -- a facility expected to incease in the future, possibly to become a requirement for security purposes.
Rather than any notion of extraterrestrial, the argument here could be understood as relating to "epiterrestrials", as discussed separately (Sensing Epiterrestrial Intelligence (SETI): embedding of "extraterrestrials" in episystemic dynamics? 2013). This includes the following sections:
As indicated there, one inspiration for use of "epi" follows from the problematic outcome of the Human Genome Project. This mapping of the human genome was originally promoted widely as providing information capable of explaining all human variability -- as being genetically determined. With the successful completion of the mapping it became apparent that, although valuable, there was also a need to focus on the changes in gene expression or cellular phenotype, caused by mechanisms other than changes in the underlying DNA sequence. This contrasting focus is termed epigenetics -- in which the prefix "epi" is indicative of notions such as over, above, or outer. Use of "extra", as with "extragenetic", was considered inappropriate for this purpose.
In the light of this genome mapping example, rather than "extra-terrestrial" (with its strong implication of "non-terrestrial"), what might "epi-terrestrial" then suggest? "Extra-terrestrials" may not exist tangibly in the sense that many would wish them to exist -- and this is consistent with the view of those who do not believe they exist. "Extra-terrestrials" may however exist in other senses -- yet to be understood -- for which the term is less appropriate. Hence the interest in "epiterrestrial". Engagement with the reality of nature is also discussed separately with in terms of Epimemetics, biomimetics, epimimetics and biomemetics (2010).
The progressive "borgification" or "cyborgification" of humanity has been noted (The 'Cyborgification' of a Generation, Journalism's Notepad, 21 January 2012; Eric Bruenner, Interview: The Cyborgification of Humanity, Gamification, 20 June 2011; Greg Stevens, Cyborgification, Second Nexus, 26 June 2015). The emphasis in the argument above is on the unexplored challenge of human cognitive potential, in contrast to the hive-minded characterization of the Borg (THEM as the "borgification" of US, 2015).
Rather than an increasing degree of cyborgification, the contrasting opportunity could be succinctly framed by "psiorg", namely as a "psychological organism", rather than as a "cybernetic organism". Despite the climsiness of the term, the emphasis would then be on "psiorgification", or the increasing dimensionality of the human psyche -- for which other terms exist. In this respect, it is relevant to note that the cybernetics of cyborgs typically takes the form of first-order cybernetics, with limited consideration of second-order cybernetics. With respect to the increasing dimensionality of psiorgs, third order cybernetics and fourth order cybernetics become of relevance (Roberto Gustavo Mancilla. Third Order Cybernetics and a Basic Framework for Society, Journal of SocioCybernetics, 42, 2011, 9). The higher dimensionality is discussed separately with respect the experience of waiting (Degrees of "meta-waiting" recognized as "deep waiting"? 2018; Waiting framed by other modes of engaging with time, 2018).
Both in terms of the psychological embedding implied by epiterrestrial, and the dynamics implied by Homo undulans, any "implants" are then to be understood in cognitive terms as variously derived from nature as species behaviours or other processes. Rather then the cyborg-like implication of exoskeleton, as discussed above, these implants are then cognitively integrated within the human psyche. Rather than being permanently integrated, as stressed above these processes would be integrated temporarily as appropriate -- "donned" and then "doffed", as with clothing.
Ironically, with respect to "epi", an indicative comparison can be made with the use of foliage as body camouflage by the military or hunters. By this means they seek to blend into the terrain. How might "psychological camouflage" then be understood, especially in the light of the preoccupation of the intelligence and security services with infiltration? How indeed is it possible for humans to be cognitively "in this world" but "not of it", according to the phrase in various religions? (Kathy Howard, What Does it Mean to be in the World but Not of It? Crosswalk, 26 October 2016; Ibrahim Kalin, To be in the world but not of it, Daily Sabah, 1 August 2017; Jeff Hagan, In The World But Not Of It, Patheos, 13 June 2016; A. H. Almaas, In the World But Not of It, Diamond Approach).
Of potential relevance are myths relating to the "withdrawal into the stones" of elder races, as in the case of the Celtic Tuatha De Danan, or identification of their ancestors with rock formations by indigenous peoples -- echoed to a degree in the significance associated with tombstones.
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